Metanarrative, Meaning, and Moby Dick

So just what is the chapter "The Whiteness of the Whale" really getting at in Herman Melville's classic novel, Moby Dick? You guessed it -- the answer has something to do with hermeneutics (the rules and guidelines of interpretation). If one sees this whole story as simply the adventurous tale of a whaling boat, a captain and his crew, and a mysterious white whale, well then the meaning of this chapter is pretty clear -- it describes a literal, albino whale that is one huge, smart, treacherous, and mysterious creature. Makes a great bedtime story. Although a tad haunting.

However, if one views this story as an allegory where Moby Dick represents the biblical God, well then the chapter takes on a whole different hue, to say the least. This allegory angle for Melville's classic is not total conjecture. It could be why Melville wrote to his friend and a fellow author, Nathaniel Hawthorne, upon finishing this work, "I have written my most wicked book." Was Melville attempting to communicate that the Christian God is as tyrannical and uncaring concerning human affairs (if He indeed exists at all) as the white whale?

Anyway, this scenario of (at least) two potential ways of reading Moby Dick illustrates an important point in the interpretation of texts (and life). The point is this: One's starting point or presuppositions of the text (and life) has more than a little impact and implication for interpreting the parts of the text (and life). We interact with and interpret all of life based on something.

Han-Georg Gadamer’s mere book title, Truth and Method, provides an insight into general western hermeneutics. It is commonly understood among cultural anthropologists that there are three primary classifications of societies regarding basic approaches to life: 1) guilt/righteousness societies, which emphasize truth; 2) shame/honor societies, which emphasize harmony; and 3) fear/power societies, which emphasize well-being. Gadamer illustrated and exemplified perfectly a tacit, societal worldview assumption concerning the primary importance of determining truth in the hermeneutical process. Virtually every western text on hermeneutics follows this same implicit assumption. (Check 'em out.) Such a fundamental assumption paves the way for interpretation to naturally be the result of following a well defined and designed set of exegetical rules. In contrast a shame/honor based society where harmony is the personal and communal goal of life and interpretation, the hermeneutical process would understandably depend more on the aspect of relationship. These contrasting societal platforms form the basis of much misunderstanding between various cultures; most notably cultures of the East and of the West. They also form the basis of interpretation postures: the one dependent primarily on a set of rules for determining meaning, the other on the relationships between reader, author, and text within a metanarrative. I am not advocating the decline of focus on truth! Save the tomatoes and eggs. But, just imagine the potential balance if the book had been, Harmony and Method. 

In his book, A Quest for Humanity: The Good Society in a Global World, Menno Boldt in his (secular/ecumenical) attempt to right society tells us, "Secularists cast the 'secular-sacred' dichotomy in terms of objective versus dogmatism; the religious cast it in terms of truth versus fallacy. This dichotomization polarizes people into antagonistic ideological camps and functions as an obstacle to achieving a consensus on a humanizing ethical system. By raising barriers between and within their respective camps, both secularists and the religious hinder progress towards an ecumenical human social order. The absolute principle and concept of humane mutuality stand above the spurious, divisive secular/sacred dichotomy and provide an ethical basis for reconciling the world views of religious people and secular humanists. As such, they hold promise for an ecumenical, global, humane, and moral social order."

I bring this quote up not because I agree with Boldt's starting or ending point. Rather, as an example of how even the secularists struggle with the whole Enlightenment dichotomized view of reality. We (in the West - secularists and/or religionists) continue to be (not-so-distant) progeny of that time period and its way of thinking. It is the way we tend to view things/life/reality. We (yes, even in the religious camps) can readily divide vocations, conversations, institutions, etc into secular and sacred categories. We do this with ease - all the time - without thinking about it. We tend to think being a pastor earns more stars by your name in the Book of Life than being a plumber. We tend to think a conversation concerning predestination is (by nature) more pleasing to God than a conversation about pig farming. We might even think family is a less profane institution than politics.

Perhaps we have (too often) failed to grasp and live in the Story in such a manner so as to see the holistic nature of God's reality. Perhaps we (too often) live and think dichotomized because our introduction to and continuance in the Story is dichotomized.

No, I do not agree with Boldt's starting or ending point. But I do agree the answer to "why can't we all just get along" is helped along by some "absolute principle and concept of humane mutuality." However, Boldt and I would undoubtedly have an interesting discussion concerning how we arrive at something "absolute." Such humane mutuality has to have some foundation - some beginning - some basis - some authority, some overarching story. Boldt holds the UN is that basis, foundation, ultimate authority. Sorry, not high enough. The answer lies not in isolated "humane mutuality," but in un-dichotomized divine-human mutuality.

Remember the trio from How-to-Study-the-Bible class: observation, interpretation, and application. They were the holy trinity of Bible study. The thought was (at least in my head) that these were three distinct operations. They followed in logical order. When one was done, you moved on to the next. "Wrong!!" says Gadamer. "It is not the case that there is first a pure, objective understanding of meaning, to which special significance accrues when it is subsequently applied to our questions. We always take ourselves along whenever we understand, so much so that for Gadamer understanding and application are indivisibly fused."Never thought of it that way before: "We always take ourselves along whenever we understand." I believe that is true. At least, I don't recall every leaving myself locked up at home (shutters pulled) when out understanding the world - or the Bible.


Quote from Jean Grodin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 115.

Heidegger's understanding of fore-understanding is worthy of our understanding. He believes "human understanding takes its direction from the fore-understanding deriving from its particular existential situation, and this fore-understanding makes out the thematic framework and parameters of every interpretation." Heidegger calls this fore-structure (or, fore-understanding) existential "because it is a way of existing, a fundamental mode of being, by the power of which we deal with and try to find our way around in the world. Understanding means less a 'kind of knowledge' than a 'knowing one's way around.'... This everyday understanding almost always remains implicit. As a 'mode of being' it is not consciously thematized. We live too much within it for it to need to be made explicit. Nevertheless, all the 'things' and events that we deal with in our life-world are pre-interpreted by this anticipatory understanding." Hmm, a "mode of being" (an implicit, not-consciously-thematized, lived-in, pre-interpreted way of existing) as the basic way of knowing - anything and everything. Interesting.


Quotes taken from: Jean Grodin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 93-94.

On the notion of how we get to "know stuff" at a very basic level, Kearney has this to say, "Should the child be well-tended and protected by loving arms and tender care he/she may experience a minimum of pain; an awareness of well-being and security would likely then predominate... Conversely, if the baby experiences many deprivations and traumas, his/her general image of the Other would likely be one in which all that is not-Self is mainly a source of frustration and pain... [the former leading to an] image of Self as having an ability to affect the Other, and thus in turn affect its own condition. [The latter leading to an image of Self in which Self is] relatively powerless and incapable of affecting either its own state of being or aspects of the Other." One wonders how much hope and hopelessness/purpose and purposelessness (at a societal level) may have their roots in an early-gained "view of reality" - a view tacitly gained in the environment of Self's earliest and closest caregivers. Hmm, should this be true...


Michael Kearney, Worldviews (Novato: Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Inc., 1984) 73.

Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Thiselton, Osborne, and Vanhoozer - they have all helped us take seriously the role of preunderstandings (alias: worldview or metanarrative) in the process of interpretation and getting at meaning. Concerning these preunderstandings and the human framework of understanding, Moises Silva goes against the flow of many a theological hermeneutics professor when he writes in Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, "These ideas (concerning preunderstandings) have immediate consequences for the way we interpret the Bible and do theology. The common insistence that we should approach the text without any prior ideas regarding its meaning becomes almost irrelevant. And the standard advice given to theological students to study the text before consulting commentaries, or to determine its meaning before considering its application, appears self-defeating." Hmm, not what I heard in seminary. Or the sanctuary.


Moises Silva, ed. Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996) 21.